The operations platform that agent changes run through at a large US insurer, holding the record compensation is calculated from, across two policy estates and almost every US state.
This insurer runs two policy estates side by side. A current platform, and a legacy one being migrated onto it, each holding its own records for a book of business written across almost every US state. Agents account for a large share of it. Every policy names one agent, and that agent is a small business whose income depends on the name staying where it is.
So the field is not an attribute sitting on a policy. It is the thing an agency earns on.
agent changes a week were being made in five other systems, outside the record compensation is calculated from.
Six systems could write the agent field on a policy. Mine had no visibility of it when any of the other five did.
Every one of those changes had to be found and brought back in, and that reconciliation fell to the enterprise operations team. Every fortnight they extracted agent changes from my platform and the five others into a single document, reconciled them, then re keyed the missing ones by hand so that what compensation could read was complete.
Volume stayed flat and the backlog kept growing anyway. The process was the constraint, not the demand.
None of that arrived as a complaint, and none of it arrived as a ticket. The operations team were sending my platform twenty to twenty five inquiries a day, every one a variation on the same question. Has this policy already been changed here, or do I need to enter it?
Users don't raise tickets about work they believe is simply the job. The signal wasn't dissatisfaction. It was that they had to keep asking.
Nobody was counting them. There was no ticket queue and no owner for the volume, because as far as the operations team were concerned the asking was part of the work. I could see it only because the inquiries landed on my platform, so rather than estimate I tallied them myself across two fortnightly cycles.
Product manager for the facilitation platform. The operations team are my users. The five other systems belong to other product managers and I had no authority over any of their roadmaps. It was not on a roadmap, it had no sponsor, and no one had asked for it. I picked it up because those 22 people were my users, and the fact that they'd never framed their situation as a problem didn't stop it being one.
I didn't take this to anyone as an idea. I ran it as a proof of concept first: map the systems, their integrations and their write paths, and measure what the operations work was actually consuming. What came out of it was an architecture diagram of how the estate behaved as opposed to how everyone assumed it behaved. Only once I could state the problem precisely did I put it in front of engineering, and only once we had a solution did it go on a roadmap.
That same unpicking produced the best decision in the project. Examined individually, three of the five systems were doing the same thing. The other two were duplicating my own platform, and existed only because customer support was making agent changes by hand, one through a web channel and one through phone and chat.
hours a year returned to a team that had grown purely to absorb work nobody had budgeted for.
Seven hours per person per cycle, across 22 people and 26 cycles. That capacity went into the other operational capabilities the same team owns.
Volume did not fall. These moves still run at an average of around 979 a week and the backlog still grows, because the backlog is not a defect. It is the product of business events: agents leaving, agents behaving badly, customers requesting changes that get denied. What changed is where a move originates. It is entered in the platform in the first place now, rather than made elsewhere and chased afterwards, so reconciliation collapses into ordinary data entry. The work became tractable instead of compounding.
The nine hours that remain are genuine judgement. Corrections driven by business rules that keep changing, affecting compensation in ways you cannot automate without stripping out the review those rules exist to require. That was a deliberate stopping point rather than a wall I hit.
Twenty five inquiries a day is a support burden. Read the same number as six systems writing one field without telling each other and it is a design defect.
Own the surface a problem arrives at and you end up holding evidence about it that nobody has thought to ask you for. It is worth nothing until you go and count it, and nothing in the organisation was ever going to prompt me to.
I treated the five as one category and specified a solution against that assumption. They weren't one category, the specification didn't fit, and undoing it cost three weeks. The uncomfortable part is that the same mistake produced the best decision in the project, because examining them one by one is what showed two of them were redundant. I'd rather have arrived there by looking properly the first time than by being forced into it.
The proof of concept was the right instinct. Running it on my own wasn't. I should have brought the operations team in rather than inferring their pain from the shape of their inquiries, pulled the other product managers in before I had a solution instead of after, and had engineering looking at the architecture while I was still making assumptions. Any one of those would have surfaced the differences between those five systems inside a fortnight. I found them in week eight and paid three weeks for the privilege.